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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACCOUNTANTS ASK THE COURT TO TURN SUBSECTION (2)(a) INTO 
MEANINGLESS SURPLUSAGE. 
At page 30 of his initial brief, Reynolds identified several decisions from this 
Court1 that applied the rule of statutory construction requiring courts to interpret a statute 
in a way that gives effect to each "word, phrase and clause" of the statute. 
At the same page of his initial brief, Reynolds also identified and relied on a 
decision from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Chestnut Corp. v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer, 
Ltd., 667 N.E.2d 543, 547 (111 Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, 671 N.E.2d 727 (Table) 
(111. Oct 02, 1996), that applied this rule of statutory construction to the 1986 Illinois 
Statute that Reynolds discussed in his initial brief: 
Defendants' reading of the statute also runs contrary to these principles of 
statutory construction. If the second clause in subparagraph (2) of section 
30.1 meant what defendants claim it means -that there can never be 
liability unless a letter is written - then the first clause is trumped in all 
cases and becomes meaningless surplusage. Under the Illinois law cited, 
we decline to adopt the defendants' reading. A third party may state a 
cause of action under the statute even though there is no writing, (emphasis 
added) 
After Reynolds filed his initial brief, this Court has reiterated this rule. In State v. 
Phong Nguyen, 2012 UT 80, \ 18, 722 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 this Court emphasized the 
"cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that we interpret statutes so that no part or 
provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section 
will not destroy another." (citations omitted). 
1
 Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16, f 8, 157 P.3d 797; Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 
1372, 1374 (Utah 1986); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,252 (Utah 1988). 
- 1 -
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Nowhere in their Appellees' Brief do the Accountants address this basic principle 
of statutory construction, the opinions of this Court that Reynolds cited, or Chestnut's 
express holding that courts should not construe language such as that contained in UTAH 
CODE § 58-26a-602(2)(b) ("Subsection (2)(b)") in a way that would turn the language of 
UTAH CODE § 58-26a-602(2)(a) ("Subsection (2)(a)") into meaningless surplusage. 
II. A STATEMENT OF THE SPONSOR OF LEGISLATION IS EVIDENCE OF 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
Rather than attempting to reconcile with this Court's precedent and the Chestnut 
opinion the plain reality that their interpretation of Subsection (2)(b) eliminates 
Subsection (2)(a) from UTAH CODE § 58-26a-602 ("Section 602"), the Accountants 
instead take issue with Reynolds' use of legislative history in his initial brief. 
In response to Reynolds' citation to Sen. John Valentine's statement during floor 
debate, the Accountants make dismissive references to the irrelevance of statements by "a 
legislator", an "individual legislator" and "one legislator". See Appellees' Brief at 24-25. 
Sen. Valentine was, however, not simply "a legislator". Rather, he was the 
sponsor of 2000 Utah S.B. 226, which the Utah Legislature enacted as 2000 Utah Laws, 
ch. 261, and which contains both Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as part of Section 602. 
Because Sen. Valentine was speaking as the sponsor of the Current Utah Statute, 
his statement during floor debate that the enacting bill did not involve any "policy 
change" to the then-existing 1990 Utah Statute is entitled to weight that is not afforded to 
the words of "a [mere] legislator". See, e.g., State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, Tf 41, 
153 P.3d 804, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah Jun 12, 2007); cf. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2002 UT 95, f 16, 61 P.3d 989; Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & 
Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1989) 
III. THE MEANING OF "INTENDED" FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION (2)(b). 
In the words of Subsection (2)(b) the required intent is that "the professional 
services performed on behalf of the client were intended to be relied upon by" Reynolds. 
Although the Utah Certified Public Accountant Licensing Act codified at UTAH 
CODE §§ 58-26a-101 et seq. (the "Act") defines certain terms in sections 58-26a-102 and 
incorporates additional definitions from UTAH CODE § 58-1-102, the Act does not define 
"intend". The general statutory definitions contained in UTAH CODE § 68-3-12.5 also do 
not define "intend". In the absence of any statutory definition, it is appropriate to resort 
to common-law definitions of a word. Cf. In re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 134, 139, 270 
P.2d 449, 452 (1954); UTAH CODE § 68-3-11 ("Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved usage of the language;..."). 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 1023 (1921) 
this Court acknowledged that "every man must be held to intend the natural and probable 
consequence of his deeds." 
More recently, in Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, fflf 22, 25-26, 122 P.3d 599 this 
Court employed a definition of "intent" that requires that a battery defendant either (i) 
desired to cause certain consequences, or (ii) believed that those consequences were 
substantially likely to result from defendant's aclibns;1 : -'••*" : ? 
Then, in Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, If 43, 203 P.3d 962, this Court 
held that a workers' compensation defendant "intended" an employee's injuries if the 
- 3 -
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defendant/employer "knew or expected" that its actions would injure the employee. 
Therefore, under Subsection (b)(2) the Accountants "intended" Reynolds' reliance 
on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice if the Accountants (i) 
desired that Reynolds rely on the professional services that the Accountants' provided to 
Altaview, (ii) believed that Reynolds' reliance on the Accountants' work for Altaview 
was substantially likely to result, or (iii) knew or expected that Reynolds would rely on 
the professional services that the Accountants provided to Altaview. 
Additionally, the "approved usage of the language" that UTAH CODE § 68-3-11 
directs Utah courts to apply is consistent with these definitions of "intend". See, e.g., 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (alternatively defining "intend" as "[t]o 
contemplate that the usual consequences of one's act will probably or necessarily follow 
from the act, whether or not those consequences are desired for their own sake. . . ." 
IV. SUBSECTION (2)(b) DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ACCOUNTANTS' INTENT TO 
APPEAR IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT. 
The Accountants argued below that "[a]n accountant is liable to a non-client under 
the near privity exception only when the accountant provides the client with a writing 
that meets the requirements of subsection (2)(b)." (R. 199) (emphasis added). The 
Accountants repeat this argument at page 16 of their Appellees' Brief, where they write: 
The plain language of the near privity exception to the privity of contract 
rule allows an accountant to extend its potential liability to a non-client 
only if the accountant and client both intend for a particular non-client to 
.. rely on the professional services the accountant provided to the client, and 
the accountant sent its client a writing stating that the accountant intended 
for the particular non-client to rely on the professional services the 
accountant performed for the client. 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
never been able to identify a single }vriting from the Accountants to Altaview which 
stated that the Accountants intended for Reynolds to rely on the professional services the 
Aa militants peiitumeil Im \n,i\iin Insii'id i(niiol«IU submittal <i iiiinJiiiiasli nf 
documents which he claimed satisfied subsection (2)(b).") 
Throughout their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants repeat their theme of "a" or 
"the' writing in an effort, to create the perception that only a single document can sat isfy 
Accountants' reading of Subsection (2)(b), that the requisite "intent" requires a single, 
unitary document. In fact, Utah law is the opposite of the Accountants' position. 
Al page 4} ol' his iiiutuill hurl, IM yields' disnr- ! - tr-^ ,s-- r* 
establishing that when multiple documents are substantially contemporaneous or 
exchanged as part of the same transaction and are clearly interrelated or concern the same 
subfal mallt'i., < nmis t nnsimr (liPiti as -i \\UoW aiiil harmonize their meanings if possible, 
even if the documents do not refer to one another The ^\ ccoi intants ignore those 
opinions in their argument that their intent must appear in a single document. 
E\ en under the formidable strictures 01 utaii s Mah.-k . i Frauds, several writings 
sharing a common nexus may be construed fopdhii is - nnlmmnj! i'l 'I PIIII, \\\ . 
contract, notwithstanding the fact they are not all signed by the party whose intent is at 
issue, See Gregersonv. Jensen, 61 7 P.2( 1 369, 3 1 2 73 (I J tah 1980), - ':'" •• -'':' - -
2
 Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utan . dullfrog Marina, Inc. i\ 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 267, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972) 
5 
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Gregerson arose under UTAH CODE § 25-5-1, the section of the Utah Statute of 
Frauds that requires that all estates or interests in real property be "in writing". See id. at 
372. More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied Gregerson in concluding that 
multiple documents can properly be read together to satisfy UTAH CODE § 25-5-3 (2007), 
the section of the Utah Statute of Frauds that requires that all leases and contracts for 
interests in real property be "in writing". See Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, f 22, 
234 P.3d 1156, cert, denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah Sep 27, 2010). Following Gregerson, 
the Wilson court held that when a contract is expressed in multiple documents, even 
where some of the documents are unsigned, the statute of frauds is met when the signed 
writings expressly reference the unsigned writings. 
When the "in writing" language of the Statute of Frauds can be satisfied by several 
signed documents along with unsigned documents that the signed documents reference, it 
is difficult to see why the "in writing" language of Subsection (2)(b) should mean 
something different. Nothing in Subsection (2)(b) requires that the Accountants' 
intention be expressed in a single document and the Accountants offer no explanation or 
justification for their argument that it does. 
The absence from Subsection (2)(b) of any requirement that the Accountants' 
intention appear in a single document prevents the inference of such a restriction into the 
statute: "[W]e will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and we have no power:t&\-: •:: : ,; 
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 
110, U 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted). 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2)(b) contains any requirement that their intention for Reynolds to ivly on the 
Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice must appear in a single document. 
V. SUBSECTION(2)(b)DOES l\lor KKgriKi' I in \ u tM<NI AN I* I1 N I V M • 11> 
B E EXPRESSLY STATED, 
The Accountants further assert without analysis or support that the trier of fact 
may not properly infer the Accountants' intent because such an inference "would 
effectively nullif) the w riting i equii ement :)f the nea t: pi i\ it) exception "' appellees' 
Brief at 19-20. According to the Accountants, "the writing requirement * i ' . " ^ n 
(2)(b) would become meaningless if it can be satisfied by a jin\ finding by inference 
from one or more documents that an accountant intended that a non-client rely on the 
accountant's worl • ' -untants 1 n ge th is coi ir I: t :) hold that the 
required writing "must expressly state that the accountant intended for a particular non-
client to rely on the accountant's work." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
Hownn, |iisl \v\ Siilva'uion (,M(hi s;r\s ii<iliiiiii« «ilM>LH .1 single ijot'i 11 111 11 ilso 
does not require an "express statement" of intent. The Accountants provide no hi - I'm 
this claimed requirement, and the LM.I. decision that Reynolds discusses above makes 
clciiii (li ml ill UIIMMIK imprnpi I In en^nil! JIH/II 1 suhstunliu llci u» (111(0 subsection (2)(b). 
As is the case with the Accountants' "single-document >••:•. *k' 
expressly state" argument is also contrary to Utah law, demanding a.s it . » ^ ,ai the 
C011 11 t 1 ead iiitc Si lbsection (2)(b) a limitation on Reynolds ' cause of action against the 
Accountants that is not contained in 1 he language of Subsection (2)(b). 
-7-
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VI. SUBSECTION (2)(b) DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE JURY FROM INFERRING 
THE ACCOUNTANTS'INTENT. 
Inferences are a common and necessary tool in resolving legal disputes because 
[t]he nature of the world about us and the goings on therein are such that 
we witness only a small percentage of it by direct observation. A large 
portion of our awareness and knowledge is necessarily derived from 
deductions based upon our observations of existing facts and 
circumstances. It is important to apply this principle to the prerogative of 
the court as the fact trier. He is entitled to make his findings of fact, not 
only on evidence concerning direct observations, but also to draw whatever 
inferences a person of ordinary intelligence and experience could fairly and 
reasonably draw therefrom. 
Morris v. Farmers Home Mut, Ins, Co,, 28 Utah 2d 206, 209, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972) 
(emphasis added). 
The Morris opinion later returned to the "prerogative" of the trier of fact when it 
referred to the "traditional rules which allow the trial court the prerogative not only of 
finding the facts shown by the direct evidence, but also of drawing any reasonable 
deductions and inferences that could fairly and reasonably be derived therefrom." Id, at 
507-08. 
The "inference" that this Court has held the trier of fact has the prerogative to 
make is 
a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact in the case, 
not presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the fact itself, but 
inferred from the establishment of other facts from which, by the process of 
logic and reason, based upon common experience, the existence of the 
assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of the fact. 
Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 109, 239 P.2d 193, 198 (1951) 
- 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A 11(1 the law "requires" that a tt ial coi 11 t pe i oill: the ji i:n to \ ' • elgli inferences along 
with the evidence presented in the case to contravene the inference. See id. at 199. 
In only the past five years IJtah appellate courts have identified numerous 
e.g., Stern v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 2012 U1 16. fft
 t j , 4 ? , i / 4 
P.3d 935 (inference of intent that a covenant run with the land); Anderson \, Knser. 201 1 
I r 1' hh, ll| lu, Jhb i" M I N I"''" | ) raudulent intent is often inferred based on the totality of the 
circumstances in a case."); Christensen & Jetisi //, P ( ' ^ / n v / z - l 1 Daincs. .*'i' K)K I I I M , 
f 47, 194 P.3d 931 (inference that the attorneys in different law firms intended to divide 
the fees in proportion to the services performer lawyer); Ellsworth Paulsen 
Con st G ) i > 5 ! SI :) R I I C , - MS (inlVreiu r ^\( inlrnl t 
share losses); Wilson v. Johmun, 201U w 1 App 137, *]j 22 (inference of intent regarding 
purchase price increase). 
VII INTENT IS A QUESTION OF I"1 vm i 1^  >i< i IIK ,IHK V ,«I,I" m is INAPPROPRIATE 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
However, the fact that the trier of fact (in this case, a jury) is required when 
necessary to infer intent at tiial does not permit a trial court to infer intent - as the trial 
court did in ti "<? - in.se in con nection 1/1:1:1. a si immai ;; ji ldgment motion In Wit s : n i 
Johnson, 2010 l!T \ p p 137? ][ 22 , the trial court inferred intent in the process of resolving 
a summary judgment motion where intent was disputed. T V T u h Tourf f Appeal:, 
reversed 1 he trial : • :)i , t: It I )ecai lse ft ictual dispi i1 es i ibe r ill: par t ies' ' intent cannot be res( i. v\. 
by summary judgment. 
- 9 -
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In this case, the Accountants themselves have identified the following undisputed 
facts that could permit the jury to infer at trial that the Accountants intended that 
Reynolds would rely on the Accountants' professional services: 
• Reynolds was both the president and the sole equity owner of the Altaview 
Companies, the Accountants' clients. (Appellees' Brief at 6); 
• Because the Altaview Companies were pass-through companies, the 
Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice "unavoidably 
related to Reynolds." (Appellees' Brief at 31); 
• The Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice included 
reviewing estimated taxes and net proceeds from the sale of Altaview that 
"would ultimately flow through to Reynolds." (Appellees' Brief at 31); 
• Reynolds "would ultimately be responsible for taxes on the sale of the 
Altaview companies." (Appellees' Brief at 32); 
• The Accountants drafted the engagement letter which Altaview signed as 
the Accountants drafted it.3 (Appellees' Brief at 7-8 & Exhibit 1); and 
• The Accountants "knew that a primary intent of Altaview was to have the 
Accountants' professional services benefit or influence Reynolds." 
(Appellees' Brief at 10, 16).4 
3
 At page 32 of their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants make the curious assertion that 
Reynolds claims to be "the true intended beneficiary" of the engagement letter between 
Tanner and Altaview. Reynolds has never taken the position before the trial court or on 
appeal that he was a "beneficiary" of that agreement, intended or otherwise. Indeed, the 
word "beneficiary" never appears in Reynolds' initial brief on appeal. Reynolds' 
position has consistently been that nothing in Section 602 bars his claims against the 
Accountants because the Accountants intended Reynolds' reliance on the Accountants' 
tax and transactional services and advice at all times during the engagement that followed 
execution of the engagement letter that the Accountants drafted. 
4
 At page 29 of their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants make the unremarkable 
observation that "[i]f reasonable jurors, properly instructed, would be able to come to 
only one conclusion there is no genuine issue of material fact." The Accountants fail, 
however, to analyze this concept or to show how in light of these undisputed facts 
reasonable jurors could only conclude that the Accountants did not intend that Reynolds 
would rely on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice. 
- 1 0 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At pages 46-48 of his initial brief, Reynolds discussed numerous undisputed and 
competent documents from which the jury could infer that the Accountants intended that 
Reynolds would be influenced by, and would rely on, the Accountants' tax and 
transactional services and advice. 
Two particular documents highlight the Accountants' intention: 
• In an e-mail Ben Covington asked Bickel to confirm that (i) Reynolds 
would be personally liable for the Altaview Companies' taxes, and (ii) the 
Altaview Companies should include income as a basis for Reynolds' stock 
based on the assumption that Reynolds' proceeds from the closing would 
be used to pay the Altaview Companies' tax liability. Bickel responded to 
both of these questions regarding Reynolds' personal tax liability: "You are 
correct on both points." (R. 295-96, 436, 595-86 (Add. B to Reynolds' 
initial brief)) 
• On October 28, 2010, Bickel wrote in an e-mail: "I was reviewing the 
spreadsheet and I think we may have inadvertently excluded from Scott's 
proceeds the distribution of the installment note, which potentially changes 
the tax quite a bit." (R. 5, 21, 122, 124, 191, 235, 237 (Add. B to Reynolds' 
initial brief), 321-23)) (emphasis added)5 
In Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104, 111 (Utah 1991) this Court reversed a 
trial court's determination of intent as part of its ruling on a summary judgment motion: 
[Wjeighing evidence is proper only when making findings of fact, not when 
determining questions of law in interpreting a contract on a motion for 
summary judgment. There is sufficient ambiguity regarding the intentions 
of the parties to this transaction that the trial court could not properly 
resolve this action in the Winegars' favor as a matter of law. We therefore 
reverse and remand this case for trial on the issue of intent. 
5
 At page 9 of their Appellees' Brief, the" Accountants paraphrase the contents of this e-
mail so as to remove its express references to Reynolds and to Reynolds' personal tax 
liability: "In late October, 2010, while reviewing one of Covington's spreadsheets, Bickel 
realized that it did not include the principal amount of an installment note as an asset that 
was distributed at closing." 
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See also, Ellsworth Paulsen Const, 2008 UT 28, f 19 (improper to infer on summary 
judgment whether contracting parties intended to share losses). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should REVERSE the trial court's summary 
judgment that the Accountants did not indicate in writing that the Accountants intended 
for Reynolds to rely on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice. 
DATED: January 23, 2013 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, p.c. 
By: J A 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, R. Scott Reynolds 
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